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Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the
Internet on Modern Securities Regulation
By John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Miranda: ... 0 brave new world
That has such people in't!
Prospero: 'Tis new to thee.'
It is now a trite commonplace that the advent of the Internet will in
time revolutionize securities regulation. Merely the facts that the Internet
has somewhere between thirty and sixty million users worldwide today
(with an estimated ten to thirty million in the United States) 2 and that
some 800,000 U.S. investors already have online brokerage accounts 3 es-
tablish that there is a potential global market that can be accessed at very
low cost. But the magnitude of the market says little about what will be
the character and effect of this approaching revolution.
Technological change is not a new phenomenon for securities markets,
and, in the past, such transitions have not necessarily been benign for
investors. The introduction of the telegraph and the telephone profoundly
changed the character of the securities markets, increasing the speed with
which information could reach the market and the accessibility of investors
to issuer communications. But an indirect result was to increase the infor-
mational advantages possessed by the professional trader over the average
investor. More recently, the appearance of the computer revolutionized
securities markets by facilitating the application of modern financial eco-
nomics to actual trading decisions and making feasible the use of complex
*Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author would like
to thank the participants in a symposium at Washington University Law School and to
acknowledge financial assistance from the Milton Handler Research Fund at Columbia Law
School.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 5, sc. 1.
2. See Andrew Kantor & Michael Neubarth, Off the Charts, INTERNET WORLD, Dec. 1996,
at 45, 46-47. For a forty million estimate, see Greg Allio & Gary Lloyd, WebStock: The Latest
Internet Love-In Will Be the Direct Selling of Shares, RECORDER, July 1, 1996, at 6, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Recrdr File.
3. See Allio & Lloyd, supra note 2; see also Greg Miller & Tom Petruno, For Investors, the
Internet Has Promises, Perils, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at AI, available in 1996 WL 10574186
(estimating that 1.3 million such accounts will be opened by 1998).
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portfolio trading strategies. Again, the individual investor seems to have
been largely a bystander to this transition. Thus, that improvements in
information technology can reduce costs, increase speed, and expand the
audience accessible to an issuer or other provider of financial information
is not a new story,4 but in the past this has not implied the advent of a
kinder, gentler world for investors.
This prefatory comment is not intended to imply that pessimism is jus-
tified about the implications of the Internet, but only to suggest that sig-
nificant transitions typically have both upsides and downsides. Indeed, the
introduction of the Internet may have unique positive implications that
distinguish it from prior technological advances. Among these possible
implications, the following stand out.
INVESTOR EMPOWERMENT
Earlier improvements in information technology primarily seem to have
increased the ability of informed traders to reap arbitrage profits. Para-
doxically, even as market efficiency was enhanced, technological innova-
tions exacerbated informational asymmetries with the result that informed
traders profited handsomely at the expense of the uninformed. 5 In con-
trast, the Internet raises at least the prospect that informational asymme-
tries will be reduced, not aggravated.
6
4. Indeed, it is a story others have perceptively examined at periodic intervals. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 747 (1985); OFCE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ELECTRONIC BULLS
AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (U.S. Gov't.
Printing Office, Sept. 1990).
5. The impact of the telegraph on the securities markets provides a fascinating example
of how the gains from technological innovations can be appropriated by a limited number
of traders. Prior to the telegraph's invention, news reached the securities markets primarily
by mail, but reached traders in the market at more or less the same time. The invention of
the telegraph introduced significant informational asymmetries, in part because use of the
telegraph was costly in comparison to the mail. Those who could afford to use the telegraph
got news ahead of those that could not-and traded ahead of them. The easiest way for the
informed trader to profit was by arbitraging the price differences between securities traded
in two different markets. As a result, the differences between the prices of securities traded
in both London and Glasgow narrowed significantly between 1846 and 1860 as telegraph
technology was introduced and made reliable. See R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON AND NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGES, 1850-1914, 7-10 (1981). A similar narrowing of price differ-
entials occurred between stock prices in New York and London once the trans-Atlantic cable
was laid in 1866. Id. at 47-48.
In contrast, the Internet (in part because of its broad accessibility and low cost) offers the
prospect of a market that comes closer to approaching the ideal of a market of homogeneously
informed traders. For a fuller treatment of these issues and a more skeptical view that such
a homogeneously informed market is unlikely, see Paul Mahoney, Technology, Property Rghts
in Information, and Securities Regulation, 73 WASH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming in symposium issue
in 1997).
6. This is not to suggest that all informational advantages will be eliminated by the In-
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Earlier technological innovations (such as the telephone) seem to have
assisted the issuer more than the investor, allowing the former to target
the latter. In contrast, while the Internet may assist the prospective issuer
to access the market, it does even more to enable the investor to obtain
significantly more information without filtration by brokers or other se-
curities professionals who may have a self-interest in promoting transac-
tions. Indeed, on the Internet, it is closer to the truth to say that the
audience finds the issuer, rather than the issuer finding the audience. Not
only can investors immediately access the EDGAR database, 7 but they
can also engage in new non-linear browsing strategies through hyperlink
features that connect related materials.
The benefits are even clearer in the context of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act). Rival proxy solicitations can now reach the ben-
eficial owners almost at once through World Wide Web (Web) sites; the
proxy itself may give way to electronic voting by the individual share-
holder; e-mail permits better informed interaction between broker and
customer; and new "chat rooms," while vulnerable to fraud, permit far
more sophisticated and current intra-investor communications than did
their only real precursor, the investment club. On the near-term horizon,
there is the prospect of alternative trading systems on the Internet that will
permit shareholders to trade with each other without the costly interven-
tion of financial intermediaries. On the longer-term horizon, there is even
the visionary possibility that the Internet can be used to pass through
voting rights in securities held by pension and mutual funds to the fund's
own owners or beneficiaries8-a possibility that carries with it profoundly
destabilizing implications for institutional investors. 9
temnet. The information in the Securities and Exchange Commission's EDGAR database is
often stale, and access to it will not equalize informational advantages. But the Internet does
much more than simply make the information filed pursuant to the SEC's mandatory dis-
closure system available to investors. Other sources of information, particularly those reach-
ing online services, are very current, although not always reliable. To the extent that market
prices are moved by rumors and possibilities of future contingent events, online services
provide the individual investor with substantially greater access to such "noisy" information.
This is both a virtue and a vice, as discussed later.
7. SEC, EDGAR Database (last modified May 5, 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp
.htm>.
8. For the first suggestion of this possibility, see John C. Wilcox, Electronic Communication
and Proxy Voting: The Governance Implications of Shareholders in Cyberspace, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1997,
at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Insite File.
9. I do not mean to imply that the pass through of voting rights would be a sensible
change from a public policy standpoint. If large institutions holding portfolios with several
thousand stocks are today often overloaded, individual pensioners would be both swamped
and rationally indifferent to the outcome of most proxy contests (given their small stakes).
Still, a continuum of possibilities exists: beneficial owners could opt out and cast their own
votes, or could engage in referenda that would inform, or even formally instruct, the fidu-
ciaries holding the actual voting power.
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MARKET EFFICIENCY
The cost of acquiring and processing information has long been rec-
ognized as one of the constraints that determine the boundaries of the
efficient market.' 0 In other words, whether the stock price of a corporate
issuer fully reflects all available information about the issuer (the usual
definition of "semi-strong" market efficiency) depends in turn on the cost
of acquiring information about that issuer. Reduce those costs, and the
boundaries of the efficient market expand. Thus, one implication of the
Internet's advent is that the boundaries of the efficient market may extend
outward to include less actively traded securities on regional exchanges or
the lower tiers of NASDAQ that are not today closely followed by secu-
rities analysts. This has both legal consequences"I and deregulatory policy
consequences for proposals such as "company registration," which would
essentially abandon (or at least relax) the transactional focus of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).
12
STATUTORY OBSOLESCENCE
By the same token, the advent of the Internet also seems likely to hasten
the obsolescence of legal concepts upon which federal securities regulation
has pivoted for the last sixty-odd years, but which were clearly premised
on a paper-based information technology. Concepts such as "solicitation,"
"gun jumping," and "free writing," which are all central to the 1933 Act,
presuppose a specific transactional structure for primary market securities
offerings-i.e., the large, discrete offering separated in time and space
from other offerings and effected by professional intermediaries (called
underwriters)-that may change dramatically in a world of electronic
communications. Similarly, in the context of secondary markets, the stat-
utory structure of the federal securities laws has long assumed that the
distinction between an "exchange" and a "dealer" was virtually self-evi-
dent. 13 Yet, as the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission
or SEC) has appropriately recognized in a recent concept release, the line
10. See RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
11. Generally, the "fraud on the market" doctrine applies only to companies traded in
an efficient market. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Lurvey, Who Is Bespeaking to Whom? Plaintiff Sophis-
tication, Market Information, and Forward-Looking Statements, 45 DUKE L.J. 579, 593-94 (1995).
12. See SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes
(last modified Oct. 25, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm> [herein-
after Report of the Advisory Committee]; see also Securities Act Concepts and their Effect on Capital
Formation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37480, 62 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1046 (July 25,
1996).
13. Of course, it has long been clear, if it was not in 1934, that some very close questions
could arise on the boundary. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991).
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between these two legal categories has blurred. 14 New information tech-
nology has given birth to functional substitutes (dubbed "alternative trad-
ing systems" in this release) 15 that are rapidly becoming serious competi-
tors to both the auction market and the dealer market. While competition
is socially desirable, the understandable concern of regulators is that these
new entrants may escape the oversight and accountability that the tradi-
tional exchanges have long accepted.
Statutory obsolescence is inevitable not simply because the nature of
transactions will change or new competitors will appear. Rather, the In-
ternet simply does not fit within the concepts known to the federal secu-
rities laws. 16 For example, the 1933 Act draws a basic distinction between
"oral" and "written" communications, tolerating the former during pe-
riods in which the latter are basically forbidden. '7 Yet, as one federal court
has already found, the Internet is a "unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication,"' 18 which therefore does not fit within
this "oral" versus "written" schematization.
This does not mean that radical deregulation is therefore required.
Fraud remains fraud, whether the medium of communication is oral, writ-
ten, or electronic. Indeed, new justifications for increased regulation also
surface. In a slower, paper-based world, quarterly reporting frames were
deemed adequate for purposes of the 1934 Act's continuous disclosure
system (and even aspirational in comparison with the rest of the world).
But in an era of electronic communications, it is possible to advocate a
much more rapid reporting obligation-and possibly even an obligation
to report all material information on a timely, current basis. 19 Similarly,
while the delivery obligation imposed by the 1933 Act with regard to the
14. See Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38672, 64 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 1631 (May 23, 1997) [hereinafter Regulation of Exchanges].
15. Id. at 1635.
16. For reasons both of space economy and the author's limited knowledge, this Article
does not undertake to describe the internal structure, organization, or operation of the In-
ternet. But for a very accessible description in an important judicial opinion, see ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994). The "oral" versus "written" distinction is basically made
by section 2(10) of the 1933 Act which defines the term prospectus to mean "any prospectus,
notice, circular, advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or television,
which offers any security for sale." Thus, oral statements do not amount to a prospectus and
hence can be communicated during the "waiting period" prior to effectiveness without vi-
olating section 5(b) of the 1933 Act. Id. § 7 7e(b). But is an interactive Internet communication
shown on a computer monitor oral or written or something else? See infra text accompanying
notes 43-47.
18. SeeACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
19. The difficulty in any such proposal is not technological but legal. Today, silence is
not actionable, absent a duty to disclose. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231
(1988). Such an obligation can arise because of a reporting requirement under the 1934 Act.
Thus, a consequence of a constant obligation to report material developments on a timely
basis is vastly to increase the risk of liability.
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final prospectus was greatly relaxed by recent amendments to Rule 434
in light of the advent of T + 3 settlement, 20 immediate electronic delivery
of the final prospectus is feasible, and arguably should be required.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Clearly, new competitors are appearing (such as the above-mentioned
"alternative trading systems"), and normally this should reduce the cost
of services to consumers. But, as new entrants appear, their arrival may
also expose the arbitrary and outdated character of the existing regulatory
structure, which leaves some new entrants arguably underregulated and
thereby results in an unlevel playing field. Also, to the extent that new
competitors (such as electronic communication networks) begin to com-
pete with, and partially supplant, existing financial intermediaries (such as
underwriters), some of the traditional functions performed by the older
intermediary (such as the gatekeeper role of underwriters) may be lost or
abandoned, arguably with consequent social injury.
DISINTERMEDIATION?
The outer limits of the changes in institutional structure that the Internet
may cause are hazy, but already the most enthusiastic prophets of the
Internet predict an approaching revolution in which issuers will directly
access investors over the Internet (without the need for the costly services
of underwriters) and in which shareholders will directly trade with other
shareholders (without the need for brokers or dealers).21 The common
denominator in these scenarios is the relative disappearance, or at least
downsizing, of traditional financial intermediaries-a possible develop-
ment this Article calls "disintermediation."
How likely is the prospect of disintermediation? This Article argues that
modest movement in this direction is likely, but major shifts are improb-
able. Advances in information technology do not render obsolete the key
services that financial intermediaries in the securities markets actually pro-
vide, namely: (i) acting as reputational intermediaries in primary market
20. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over Company
Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1153-54 & n.34 (1995).
21. Among academics, the leading prophet of the "virtual exchange" without interme-
diaries is probably ProfessorJunius Peake, a finance professor at the University of Northern
Colorado and a former vice chairman of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). See also Melissa Bane, The Virtual Exchange: Who Needs Wall Street?, COMPUTER-
WORLD, June 17, 1996, at 125A, available in 1996 WL 2372613. See Michael Meyer, Deep-
Sixing Doubloons, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1997, at 72. Professor Donald Langevoort probably
published the first prophecy that new information technology would lead to the partial re-
placement of underwriters by electronic substitutes that would permit direct sale of equity
by issuers. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 765-78. That prophecy now appears to have been
at least thirteen years premature (although it could still prove accurate and perceptive).
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transactions, and (ii) supplying liquidity and immediacy to secondary mar-
kets. Thus, the more likely prospect is for that which can be called "partial
disintermediation." Direct transactions between issuers and investors in
primary offerings and between investors in secondary market transactions
will become more likely, even if they account over the near term for only
a token minority of such transactions. Nonetheless, as intermediary-less
transactions become more common, regulatory problems will surface,
which, if they cannot yet be solved, can at least be identified.
FRAUD AND EXTRATERRITORIAL EVASION
The downside to the Internet's appearance is the increased potential
for fraud.2 2 A rogue issuer or broker (or simply a non-licensed person
offering "guaranteed safe" investments) can reach an audience via the
Internet that is larger by orders of magnitude than the same person could
have reached working a telephone in the traditional boiler room. More
importantly, not only may individual investors be overreached, but the
market in a security may be intentionally manipulated through anonymous
or misattributed tips or rumors placed on "chat rooms" and other online
bulletin boards. Although Internet fraud is far from undetectable (and
indeed is probably more easily observed than fraud from the classic boiler
room), special problems arise when the issuer (or other provider of infor-
mation) is based offshore. The SEC's practical ability to obtain effective
enforcement over the offshore rogue is at best doubtful. In addition, the
Internet creates the possibility of offshore exchanges and trading systems
that may be entirely beyond the SEC's effective reach.
In light of these multiple trends, two very different scenarios now com-
pete for dominance. On one hand, the optimistic scenario sees the poten-
tial for enormous reductions in the distribution costs for issuers and the
trading costs for investors, and the potential to introduce new competitors
into the system to replace unnecessary and costly financial intermediaries.
On the other hand, the pessimistic scenario focuses less on increased ef-
ficiencies than on the political and legal anarchy that the Internet portends.
Because the Internet network (as in reality, a collection of interconnected
nodes at which computers store information, service information requests,
and establish communication links with other systems in the network)23 is
beyond the jurisdictional reach of any centralized political or legal au-
thority, the world of the Internet arguably resembles the Hobbesian state
of nature or the American Wild West of the nineteenth century. From this
22. For an overview of the recent upsurge in Internet fraud, see Joseph J. Cella III &
John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet: Meeting the Challenge of the Next Millennium, 52
Bus. LAw. 815 (1997).
23. For a brief description of the Internet, see A.Jared Silverman, Cyberspace Offerings Raise
Complex Compliance Issues, NJ. LJ., Dec. 25, 1995, at 10, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library,
Njlawj File.
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pessinistic perspective, cyberspace may be beyond the effective reach of
traditional legal rules.
Given the magnitude of these potential changes, it would take a level
of confidence bordering on hubris to announce the likely outcome or the
optimal regulatory solution. This Article pursues only a more modest goal:
to survey recent developments in several distinct contexts and examine
the short- to intermediate-term regulatory issues that these developments
pose. A special focus is on the likely impacts of the Internet on the gate-
keepers and intermediaries who have, to date, largely operated and moni-
tored our securities markets.2 4 Specifically, the contexts examined are: (i)
the primary market (with a specific focus on the initial public offering), (ii)
the secondary market context (in light of the new SEC focus on alternative
trading systems), (iii) private markets, (iv) the new character of Internet
fraud (and what can be done about it), and (v) the extraterritorial context.
THE PRIMARYAJRKET CONTEXT
The first anniversary of the initial online public offering has already
passed without any serious effort yet being made to assess its implications.
In March 1996, a small New York microbrewer of European-style beers,
Spring Street Brewing Co., completed the first online public offering, rais-
ing a relatively modest $1.6 million without the assistance of investment
bankers. 25 Founded in 1992, Spring Street had previously raised capital
through private placements, but it was too small and unproven to attract
the attention or interest of investment banking firms. Needing to find its
own financing without the aid of investment bankers, it simply created a
Web page from which investors could download its offering documents.
Some 3500 investors purchased 844,581 shares at $1.85 per share (for a
total offering of slightly less than $1.6 million). 26
So what are the implications of this first online offering? In overview,
the Spring Street offering provides a predictable example of what happens
when a new issuer without an established reputation seeks to market its
24. The term "gatekeeper" has a special meaning within the field of law and economics:
namely, a third party typically having reputational capital whom a firm enlists to gain legit-
imacy, expertise, or satisfy a legal requirement (for example, an accountant). See Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcON. & ORG.
53 (1986).
25. For representative accounts, see Gerard R. Boyce, Offering and Trading Securities on the
Internet, N.Y. LJ., May 9, 1996, at 5, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Nylawj File; Cheryl
Currid, Microbrewery's Web IPO: A Taste of Things to Come?, HOUSTON CHRON.,June 1, 1997,
at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Hchrn File; Stephanie Gruner, When Mom and Pop Go
Public, INC., Dec. 1996, at 66, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Inc File; Mark Kollar, Do-
It-Yourself Public Offerings: The Internet Brings a New Dimension to an Old Financing Vehicle, INVEST-
MENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 24, 1997, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Idd File; A.
Jared Silverman, Securities Regulation on the Internet: Make Me an Offer Online, LEGAL TIMES,July
8, 1996, at 20, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Lgltme File.
26. See Kollar, supra note 25.
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securities on its own without an underwriter or other financial interme-
diary. Given that 3500 investors invested nearly $1.6 million, the numbers
work out to an average investment per investor of approximately $474 (or,
on a per share basis, approximately 241 shares per investor). In short, the
average investor gambled only a very small amount (even by the standards
of penny stocks) on an investment that was not associated with any well-
known investment banking or brokerage firm.
This should not be surprising. At least within the academic world, a
standard view of investment banking firms is that they serve (particularly
in the initial public offering context) as "reputational intermediaries," im-
plicitly pledging their own reputations for their often little-known clients.
27
In this view, it is not the underwriters' distributive capacity or their finan-
cial risk-bearing capability that is critical; rather, it is their ability to pledge
their reputational capital for the issuer, in effect implicitly certifying the
accuracy of its disclosures. An offering, such as the Spring Street offering,
in which the issuer does not employ such reputational intermediaries and
(possibly as a result) obtains only a very modest investment from each
investor, seems to confirm this view of the underwriter's central function.
The Spring Street offering was also accomplished through a special
exemption from registration (known as Regulation A),28 which permits the
issuer to use a short-form substitute for the much longer registration state-
ment that the SEC would ordinarily require. Although the Spring Street
offering attracted a great deal of media attention in the United States as
the first successful online offering, its value as a guidepost for the future is
limited by its reliance on Regulation A. That exemption applies only to
certain non-reporting issuers 29 and permits such an issuer only to raise
up to $5 million in the aggregate during any twelve-month period 3 0-a
ceiling well below the capital needs of most start-up companies.
Nonetheless, that anyone invested in the Spring Street offering may
have been the consequence of a unique feature of Regulation A which
permits the issuer to "test the waters" by contacting investors before it files
its offering documents. 31 In contrast, an issuer seeking to register an initial
public offering (IPO) may not condition the market in any way prior to
filing its registration statement with the SEC. For an issuer, like Spring
Street, that wants to raise capital without the assistance of investment
bankers, the ability to engage in informal contacts and solicitation before
it delivers the formal offering documents may facilitate the offering (al-
though the regulations also require the issuer to stay below the $5 million
27. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 613-21.
28. See Regulation A--Conditional Small Issues Exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263
(1997).
29. See id. § 230.25 1(a)(2).
30. See id. § 230.251(b).
31. Rule 254 permits the use of a "solicitation of interest" document prior to filing an
offering statement. See id. § 230.254.
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ceiling). A number of companies appear to be following Spring Street's
lead,3 2 and some may also be relying on Regulation A.
If the Spring Street offering thus suggests that a direct issuer offering
without any financial intermediary is more a novelty than a trend (or is,
in fact, a desperate gamble by an issuer with no other alternatives), other
contexts can be postulated in which the Internet may make such a direct
equity offering more plausible. For example, a mature company with an
existing shareholder base might well wish to conduct a subscription offer-
ing using its Web page as the principal means of contact with prospective
investors. The obvious attraction of this approach is that it eliminates the
underwriter's discount without necessitating the traditional lengthy delay
that subscription offerings required in the past.
3 3
Already, large companies have begun to use their Web pages as a means
to disseminate their prospectuses. In such a registered public offering, how-
ever, stricter limitations apply than in a Regulation A offering. Not only
may the issuer not in any way seek to "condition the market" before it
files its registration statement with the SEC,34 but, during the often lengthy
waiting period while the SEC reviews the registration statement (and ne-
gotiates changes with the issuer), "free writing" is not permitted. 35 This
means that only those written documents expressly permitted by SEC rules
can be used during this period when the offering is, in fact, being marketed
to investors. Currently, Rule 134 states the applicable limitations on writ-
ten statements (other than pursuant to a prospectus) after a registration
statement has been filed. 36 When it was promulgated, it was narrowly
framed with the traditional "tombstone ad" in mind. Hence, at present,
only limited, factual statements seem permissible on a Web page prior to
the "effectiveness" of the registration statement (if the issuer is registering
the securities and not relying on Regulation A).
32. See Internet Offerings: On-Line Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1996, at 92, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Econ File (estimating that 30 companies were then embarked on
similar initial offerings patterned after Spring Street). It is not clear that all these issuers are
relying on Regulation A; some may be attempting fully registered IPOs.
33. Of course, underwriters might (or might not) be used on a standby basis and receive
a commitment fee for this service. Although subscription offerings have not been popular in
the United States, they are the dominant distribution technique in Great Britain. One reason
for their unpopularity in the United States is the delay associated with their use. Typically,
investors are given a 30-day period to exercise the subscription warrants that were earlier
distributed to them as a dividend. This time period might easily be telescoped in a world of
electronic communications.
34. Such conditioning is known as "gun jumping" and violates section 5(c) of the 1933
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). See Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous
Offers of Securities, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 457 (1989); Joseph P. Richardson &Joseph E. Reece,
Gun Jumping, 26 REv. SEc. & COMMODITIES REG. 1 (1993).
35. See section 5(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134. The traditional "tombstone ads," which appear in financial
newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, and list the participating underwriters, are ex-
pressly permitted by Rule 134. Id. § 230.134(a)(7).
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For the mature corporation that qualifies for Form S-3, these pre-filing
restrictions are less important because their registration statements are
likely to be in a state of constant effectiveness. Yet, even though restrictions
applicable to the pre-filing or waiting periods do not apply to them, they
also cannot distribute or use written materials (other than the prospectus
or material exempted by a specific rule, such as Rule 134) until a copy of
the final prospectus is sent or given to the investor. In 1996, several issuers
used Web pages to download their prospectus.3 7 But their ability to do
more (for example, to include a short summary of the offering or to engage
in interactive communications with investors) is substantially constrained
today by the 1933 Act's prohibitions.
Against this backdrop, several legal issues of significance surface: (i)
Should the "testing the waters" loophole under Regulation A be gener-
alized to permit electronic communications prior to filing or disseminating
the formal disclosure document (whether a preliminary prospectus or a
Regulation A disclosure statement)?; (ii) How (if at all) should the pro-
hibition on "free writing" be revised to tolerate Web pages and other
electronic communications during the waiting period?; and (iii) Should
underwriter-less direct equity offerings by issuers be encouraged or dis-
couraged? And, if the former, how?
Testing the Waters
The first issue is particularly timely in light of the SEC proposal for a
new Rule 135(d), which would permit non-reporting issuers and their
underwriters similarly to "test the waters" in registered offerings by em-
ploying oral and written soliciting materials prior to filing a registration
statement.3 8 Proposed Rule 135(d) would permit "testing the waters" so-
licitations of potential investors only in the case of "non-reporting" com-
panies, and, in so doing, seemingly follows the model of Regulation A
(which is similarly available only to companies not subject to the contin-
uous disclosure requirements in the 1934 Act).
The initial problem with the "testing the waters" proposal is that it
subverts the design of the 1933 Act, which intentionally structured a "quiet
37. For example, in 1996, Berkshire Hathaway placed its prospectus on its underwriter's
(Solomon Brothers) Web page so that it could be downloaded by investors. General Motors
provided probably the best illustration of the utility of the Internet to the larger industrial
issuer. Its affiliate, General Motors Acceptance Corp., marketed $500 million in bonds by
placing its prospectus on a Web-based bulletin board, which both allowed investors to down-
load it and also supplied them with an interactive bond yield calculator with which to de-
termine their overall return. See Linda Himelstein, The Net Hits the Big Time, Bus. WK., Oct.
28, 1996, at 142, available in LEXIS, News Library, Buswk File.
38. See Securities Act Release No. 33-7188, 59 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1634 (June 27,
1995) (proposing Rule 135d). I should note that I have been elsewhere critical of this proposal.
See John C. Coffee Jr., SEC Deregulation: Sense and Nonsense, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 28, 1995, at 5,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Nylawj File.
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period" into the processing of the registration statement in order to ensure
that the statutory prospectus (and, later in the 1933 Act's history, the
preliminary prospectus) is the first document that the investor sees. The
premise (still sound in the context of IPOs) is that, if investors could see
other offering materials first, the prospectus would become simply an after-
the-fact insurance policy that lawyers would draft to protect the issuer but
that would be unreadable and unread by investors. In effect, to make the
prospectus into a viable marketing document, it had to be given a mo-
nopoly. The 1933 Act did this by both establishing a "quiet period" before
the filing of a registration statement during which the issuer (and its agents)
may not solicit or condition the market and by prohibiting the use of other
written offering materials (so called "free writing") prior to the sending of
the statutory prospectus.
For issuers subject to the 1934 Act's continuous disclosure system, the
1933 Act's premise that the prospectus should stand in lonely isolation is
no longer valid because, for such "reporting" companies, a constant
stream of mandatory disclosures will reach the market (which the Internet
makes instantly accessible to all investors). The statutory goal of a quiet
period is thus irretrievably lost. But this is not the case for non-reporting
companies. In this context (which is the only context that proposed Rule
135d addresses), legitimizing a "testing the waters" solicitation seems likely
to trivialize the preliminary prospectus. If the issuer can "front-run" its
own preliminary prospectus with an earlier solicitation document, then
the typical investor will have already made at least a tentative investment
decision based on the earlier distributed disclosure document and will have
little incentive to read the prospectus (particularly to the extent that it is
written in the inevitably cautious, padded, and generally turgid language
that lawyers insist upon for documents subject to the liability provisions
of sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act). In short, once a written offering
document is authorized that precedes the preliminary prospectus, the odds
are high that the latter document will become merely an unread "me-
mento of the transaction," suitable for framing in LuciteTM plastic cubes,
but drafted with an almost exclusive focus on liability prevention.
This is true even without the advent of new information technology.
But now add the incremental impact of the Internet, and these problems
are aggravated substantially. To the extent that the Internet may make
possible intermediary-less IPOs (as in the Spring Street Brewery case),
there is less reason to anticipate that the disclosures made in a "testing the
waters" solicitation document will be adequately verified or even exam-
ined at all by an experienced securities professional. Issuers who do not
use a broker-dealer firm as a financial intermediary are likely to be dis-
proportionately composed of fraudulent or recklessly optimistic issuers
who, in most cases, could not attract a reputable underwriter. 39 Even if
39. One justification that has been raised for Rule 135d is that few problems have been
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this is not the case, an issuer acting on its own behalf (rather than through
a broker-dealer) is not subject to many of the regulatory strictures that
bind the broker-dealer. For example, a corporate issuer is not itself subject
to any suitability obligation to refrain from recommending high-risk se-
curities to persons unable to bear such a level of risk.
Finally, the deregulatory benefits of proposed Rule 135(d) seem modest.
In theory, the proposed rule saves issuers the costs of undertaking an of-
fering that proves to be infeasible. But the issuer must incur significant
costs to find this out for itself (and often it will find that the offering will
not fly only after incurring substantial costs during a failed marketing
effort). More importantly, this is precisely the kind of estimation at which
underwriters have had long experience (including contemporaneous ex-
perience with other ongoing marketing efforts). In this light, proposed Rule
135d seems a solution to a non-problem.
Free Writing and the Reporting Issuer
If radical deregulation of the 1933 Act seems, then, to make little sense
in the case of non-reporting companies, does this same analysis carry over
in the context of reporting companies? The answer seems clearly no. First
of all, the 1933 Act's goal of a quiet period was long ago substantially
subordinated to the 1934 Act's goal of keeping the much larger number
of investors in the secondary market adequately informed. The advent of
the Internet ensures that the ordinary investor will have easy access to the
information, either directly through EDGAR or indirectly through a va-
riety of online services that filter this information into their analyses and
recommendations. More importantly, in the case of mature Form S-3
issuers, the idea of the prospectus as a critical marketing document also
seems largely out of date. Integrated disclosure long ago consigned the
prospectus to a twilight role, under which most material information about
the issuer is simply incorporated by reference into the prospectus. While
the investor may still read the summary description of risk factors in the
preliminary prospectus, Rule 434 now delays full delivery of the final pro-
spectus until well after the investment decision has been made and indeed
until after the securities have been paid for.40 Thus, there may be little to
be lost, and something to be gained, by relaxing the prohibition on the
use of alternative written offering materials to facilitate Web page com-
munications within this context.
experienced with Rule 254 under Regulation A, which permits a "testing the waters" solic-
itation document. Two short answers to this justification should suffice: (i) given the $5 million
ceiling on Regulation A, there has been relatively little interest in exploiting its permissiveness;
and (ii) Regulation A offerings were not intermediary-less until the Spring Street Brewery
offering in 1996. Thus, the experience under Regulation A for both these reasons is not
likely to provide a realistic proxy for what might happen in the case of registered IPOs.
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (1997).
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In this light, the most obvious candidate for relaxation is the prohibition
on free writing. For a mature company that may be in a state of constant
registration (with an "evergreen" Form S-3 effective at all times), gun-
jumping issues are less relevant. Such an issuer, however, remains subject
to the requirement that it not distribute any written document amounting
legally to a prospectus until it has first sent or given the investor a copy of
the final prospectus. 4 1 Yet, this issuer would undoubtedly like to use its
Web site to communicate information to investors, going well beyond the
seeming boundaries of current Rule 134. Of course, it can put its pro-
spectus (or preliminary prospectus) on its Web page for investors to ex-
amine and/or download. But should it be limited to this option? For ex-
ample, the issuer might well want to provide an additional one- or
two-page short-form summary of its preliminary prospectus on its Web
page.
A strong argument can be made that any information previously or
contemporaneously disclosed under the reporting requirements of the
1934 Act should be disclosable on a Web site without constituting imper-
missible free writing, even if the presentation or format of the information
is changed. In addition, the issuer might sensibly be permitted to make
some relatively brief statement (for example, not to exceed 200 words) on
its Web page that would introduce, integrate, and summarize these other
statements. 42 As a safeguard, this exemption could be conditioned upon
the linkage of such a Web page through a hyperlink feature to the same
disclosures in the EDGAR system. Indeed, one justification for limiting
this exemption to Web pages and similar Internet communications is the
ease with which such information can be hyperlinked to the actual 1934
Act disclosures, thus enhancing the total disclosures easily accessible to the
investor. This result would do no more than "company registration" in-
tends. The role of the formal prospectus in such a system largely would
be to attach liability to misstatements or omissions (and force the secondary
parties liable under section 11 to verify this information), but the marketing
role of the prospectus would be eclipsed.
For reporting companies not eligible for Form S-3, it is more debatable
41. This follows section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, which defines "prospectus" to include any
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication ... which offers any security
for sale ... except that (a) a communication sent or given after the effective date of the
registration statement ... shall not be deemed a prospectus if it is proved that prior to
or at the same time with such communication a written prospectus meeting the require-
ments of subsection (a) of section 77j of this tide at the time of such communication was
sent or given to the person to whom the communication was made ....
15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
42. Precisely this proposal that an up-to-200 word electronic statement be exempted from
the definition of free writing has been made by another commentator. See Joseph Mc-
Laughlin, 'Booting' the Federal Securities Laws into the 21st Century, INSIGHTS, July 1997, at 21,
22.
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whether the same wide latitude should be given. These companies still face
a true (if still relatively brief) waiting period during which time free writing
would be forbidden. 43 The complete suspension of the free writing pro-
hibition for these companies may be undesirable because it would elimi-
nate any need for a broad circulation of the preliminary prospectus in
order to market the stock. Still, if one believes that the boundaries of the
efficient market will expand with improvements in information technol-
ogy, Form S-2 is apt to apply to a shrinking category of issuers and the
eligibility standards of the Form S-3 seem likely to be lowered. In the
future, the Form S-2 category may be largely limited to companies that
have only recently entered the "reporting company" category (say within
the last twelve to eighteen months).
A last category of free writing that clearly needs reexamination is e-mail
communications between a broker and a client during the waiting period.
Today, a client may call a broker and engage in uncensored discussions
that are subject only to the antifraud rules. But if the same client prefers
to communicate by e-mail, different rules may apply. If e-mail is consid-
ered a written communication, it falls within the statutory definition of a
prospectus under section 2(10) of the 1933 Act.44 Today, written com-
munications to the client must be approved by the firm before the broker
may send them.45 All this seems arbitrary given that the use of e-mail is
usually for convenience (enabling the client both to send communications
and queries at any hour and avoid lengthy sales efforts by the broker), and
that the risk of error or miscommunication falls when e-mail is substituted
for an oral message (often left on a voicemail system). Already, the SEC
has shown some flexibility with regard to electronic communications dur-
ing this period. In a no-action letter, it has approved video transmissions
of road shows to a limited audience.46 Also, both the NYSE and the NASD
43. During 1994 and 1995, the average waiting time at the SEC for registration materials
of Form S-2 registrants was 15.6 days. See Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 12, at
appendix A, table 2.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1O). In Securities Act Release No. 33-7288, the Commission indicated
last year that the legal status of a communication under the 1933 Act could depend in part
on whether it "replace[s] or substitute[s] for telephone conversations." See Use of Electronic
Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents, and Investment Advisers for Delivery of Information, Securities
Act Release No. 33-7288, 61 S.E.C. Docket (CC-I 2167 (May 9, 1996), available in 1996
SEC LEXIS 1299, at *7.
45. Both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASD have submitted rule
change proposals to the SEC that would end the current requirement of prior approval by
the firm of all written correspondence with the client. In lieu thereof, sampling techniques
would be used, involving random spot checks and e-mail logs. See Notice of Filing of Proposed
Rule Change by the NASD, Inc. Relating to Supervision and Record Retention Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-38548, 64 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1159 (Apr. 25, 1997) (dis-
cussing the earlier NYSE proposal as well).
46. See Private Financial Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 107175 (Mar. 12,
1997). The no-action letter was premised on the concern that the video transmission could
be deemed a prospectus given the express reference in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act to
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have submitted proposed rule changes to the SEC that will end the re-
quirement of prior supervisory review of written communications by a
registered representative with a client based on the justification that such
a rule interferes too intrusively with electronic communications.
47
But a broader concept needs to be recognized: e-mail does not have to
be invariably classified as written communication. 48 Inherently, it is inter-
active, much like oral communication. Of course, this does not mean that
an existing written document, having an independent existence apart from
e-mail, should lose its character as a "prospectus" simply because it is
transmitted by e-mail. But exemptive rules can easily deal with these prob-
lems-if the SEC can be prodded to be more Internet-friendly.
Direct Issuer Offerings
On an abstract level, the case for facilitating direct issuer equity offerings
seems clear. By eliminating a costly intermediary, one seemingly removes
the underwriters' discount from the corporation's cost of equity capital.
49
Moreover, at least in the case of IPOs, there is abundant evidence that
such offerings are usually underpriced, meaning that the cost of capital is
inefficiently high from the corporation's perspective. 50 But eliminating the
underwriter would also seemingly eliminate the principal gatekeeper from
the disclosure process in primary market transactions and thus increase
the risk of fraud and the uncertainty for investors. Hence, two distinct
issues tend to become inextricably combined: (i) Are direct equity offerings
by issuers feasible?; and (ii) Are they socially desirable?
The puzzling persistence of underwriters has long intrigued theorists.
While the underwriter's reputational capital is certainly an explanation for
survival in an economic world that normally seeks to reduce transaction
costs, it seems possible in theory to obtain reputational capital in other
ways. Mature companies also may have their own reputational capital.
Some commentators have thus offered the hypothesis that the fear of li-
ability (particularly under section 11 of the 1933 Act) explains the unwill-
ingness of other parties to play the necessary role of reputational inter-
communication by television. The staff agreed, however, that video transmission to a limited
audience does not amount to "television" as that term is used in section 2(10). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(10).
47. See supra note 45.
48. For example, obvious distinction can be drawn between one-to-one e-mail and "list-
serv" communication to a broad audience.
49. This point is not as definitional as it sounds. If on the announcement of a direct issuer
offering by a mature company its stock price fell, and by an amount greater than the un-
derwriter's typical discount, the actual cost of capital to the issuer would be greater in such
a direct offering.
50. One study has found that the average operating company's IPO return is 10-l15 % on
its first day of trading-strong evidence of underpricing. See Roger G. Ibbotson et al., The
Market's Problems with the Piing of Initial Public Offerings, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1994,
at 66.
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mediary. 5 1 In contrast, the underwriter, as a repeat player, can bear this
legal risk, in part by charging a hefty insurance premium in its under-
writing discount for this risk-bearing service. Hence, the argument runs,
because no one else seems likely to take its place, the underwriter cannot
safely be discarded even if its services are not essential to marketing the
offering.
The contemporary problem with posing the issue of the underwriter's
position in these terms is that it is not clear that the underwriter today still
performs the classic gatekeeping function. This issue has been debated
since the adoption of shelf registration more than a decade ago, and most
doubt that underwriters attempt anything approaching the same due dil-
igence efforts at verification in the case of a shelf offering as they do in the
case of an IPO. Many argue that serious due diligence efforts are simply
not feasible within the time constraints of shelf registration. Given these
constraints, they claim that the solution lies in downsizing the threat under
section 11. But this is not happening. The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) has had little impact on the 1933 Act, 52 and
recent cases have, if anything, increased the threat of section 11 liability.
53
In short, underwriters seem to accept the risk of section 11 liability as a
cost of the business and factor it into their price, but do not appear to
conduct significant due diligence activities outside the IPO context. If so,
there seems less reason to discourage direct equity offerings by issuers.
Today, however, the issuer who contemplates such a direct offering
faces some special legal barriers. For example, Rule 415, which governs
shelf registration, permits an "at the market offering" of equity securities
only if the securities are "sold through an underwriter or underwriters,
acting as principal(s) or as agent(s) for the registrant."'54 This may be a
small point because a subscription offering would seemingly not qualify as
an "at the market offering" in any event, but Rule 415 effectively also
precludes the direct sale of shelf-registered equity securities by an issuer
to a group of institutional purchasers in a "bought deal."
51. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 777 (arguing that other "specialists" who assisted in
"securities marketing" would likely be deemed "underwriters" under the broad definition in
section 2(11) of the 1933 Act).
52. PSLRA substantially heightened the requirements for pleading fraud under the 1934
Act, but not the 1933 Act. New section 21D(b)(2) of the 1934 Act requires a plaintiff who
seeks to plead a cause of action under that Act (including Rule I Ob-5) to "state with partic-
ularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind." The parallel provision of the 1933 Act (new section 27(b)), however, contains no
corresponding pleading requirement (although it does provide for a similar stay of discovery
pending a motion to dismiss). Thus, except with regard to the special area of "forward-
looking statements" (see section 27A of the 1933 Act), the PSLRA does relatively little of
significance to change the balance of advantage between plaintiff and defendant under the
1933 Act.
53. Indeed, recent cases may have increased the underwriters' exposure under section 11.
See Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996).
54. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4) (1997).
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From a policy perspective, the prospect of direct equity offerings by
issuers raises two distinct issues: (i) Should some effort be made to structure
a gatekeeper into the process to test and verify the issuer's disclosures
before the current barriers to direct issuer offerings are relaxed?; and (ii)
Is it realistic to expect issuers to attempt such direct public offerings in
view of the threat of section 11 liability when the obvious alternative is a
private placement that is outside the reach of section 11 ?
Most commentators have recognized that the threat of section 11 lia-
bility gives the issuer a strong incentive to rely on a private placement (or
other exemption) as an alternative to a registered offering. But privately
placed securities trade at a discount, thus increasing the cost of corporate
capital. In response, commentators have proposed quite different answers.
Some have simply urged that section 11 be relaxed for mature compa-
nies. 55 Others have proposed modernizing section 1 1 (in order to preserve
the incentive to engage in due diligence verification of the issuer's disclo-
sures) by extending section 11 to cover the issuer's Form 10-K with the
proviso that liability could arise only at specified intervals. 56 As a practical
matter, however, both proposals to eliminate section 1 1 for reporting com-
panies or expand it to cover the Form 10-K seem politically unrealistic.
In truth, it is not clear that there is a problem here that needs answering.
The discount on privately placed securities makes private placement a
costly choice for the already public company. But, even if the private
placement exemption is used to outflank section 11, it is not evident that
this is socially undesirable given the greater possibility of carefully drawn
contractual protections in the private placement context. More impor-
tantly, the public issuer contemplating a direct equity issuance does have
an alternative that minimizes the practical risk of section 1 1 liability. Con-
siderable evidence suggests that securities class actions focus on large dis-
tributions of securities and ignore smaller distributions. 5 7 Presumably, this
55. See StephenJ. Choi, Company Registration: Toward A Status Based Ant iaud Regime, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 567 (1997).
56. ProfessorJames Cox proposes the novel ideal that periodically (he suggests every three
years) the issuer's Form 10-K would be subject to section 11 liability. See James Cox, The
Fundamentals of an Electronically-Based Federal Securities Act (forthcoming). His goal is to escape
section I l's current transactional focus, but the resulting liability risk seems enormous. More-
over, it is not clear who would have standing to assert this proposed remedy. If all persons
who acquire the equity securities in the open market over the year following the Form 10-
K's release could sue (a significantly larger population than under section 11 today), the result
would often be that a majority of the shareholders would be suing the issuer (and indirectly
the remaining minority).
57. SeeJames Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 936 (1996) (Table 2.5 shows that offerings
below $6.71 million accounted for only 14 out of 122 liability suits in the sample, or roughly
11%); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 513 (1991) (Table 3 shows that, of the 12 worst-per-
forming computer-related IPOs in 1983, the six companies with the smaller offerings were
not sued, while those with the larger were).
Modern Securities Regulation 1213
is because the entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyer sees little prospect of profit
from attacking the smaller distribution given that the expected fee will in
fact be around one-third of the recovery (discounted by the likelihood of
a defendant's victory); moreover, the plaintiff's attorneys' own costs do
not rise or fall in proportion to the size of the offering. Given this incentive
to focus on larger offerings, this in turn suggests an attractive distribution
technique made feasible by the Internet that largely oufflanks the in terrorem
risk of section 11: namely, small periodic equity "dribbles" into the market
(possibly pursuant to some form of shelf-registration statement). In terms
of feasibility, such small periodic issuances are probably the maximum
that feasibly can be sold without the assistance of an underwriter; yet, they
are small enough that they seem relatively unlikely to attract a securities
class action.5 8 As a result, at least in the case of an established issuer with
its own reputational capital, such an offering does not require an under-
writer. Even if an underwriter is used (possibly in an advisory capacity),
the issuer should be able to negotiate a smaller insurance premium for the
underwriter's services, given the underwriter's lesser legal vulnerability.
But if such "dribbled" offerings are feasible, there remains the policy
question of whether they need participation by a gatekeeper to assure
verification of information. Of course, the issuer's board of directors would
still have section 11 liability, but it is not the optimal gatekeeper. The
practical answer may be that self-distributed equity offerings will be so
rare, at least at first, that they will receive special scrutiny by the SEC
staff.59 Every agency has its priorities and, if such offerings do materialize,
direct issuer equity offerings should receive the highest level of SEC staff
attention. In short, the most logical gatekeeper is the SEC staff, whose role
would be otherwise downsized with regard to mature companies. This
suggests, in turn, that Rule 415 should not be simply extended to permit
direct issuer offerings, but that a compromise needs to be worked out that
permits greater staff scrutiny-without the long waiting period that attends
the typical IPO.
THE SECONDARY MARKET CONTEXT
The substitution of technology for intermediation has advanced farthest
in the area of secondary trading markets. Here, the daily press is filled
with predictions of electronic stock exchanges and "Wall Street Without
58. The assumption here is that the offerings will be sufficiently separated in time that
they cannot be combined into a single class. Generally, the definition of the class in a federal
securities class action includes those who purchased or sold over a relatively brief time period.
59. Commentators differ as to whether they regard the SEC as a valuable gatekeeper.
This author does. For a similar view, see Abba David Poliakoff, SECReview: Comfort orIllusion?,
17 U. BALT. L. REV. 40 (1987).
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Walls." A recent SEC release shows that the growth of alternative trading
systems now accounts for a substantial share of the NASDAQmarket.
60
Recent Development
During 1996, new categories of trading systems appeared, but, once
again, the most publicized story involved the Spring Street Brewing Com-
pany.
Spring Street's post-offering problem was predictable and flowed from
the absence of any underwriter in its primary offering. Given a broad retail
distribution to 3500 investors, the desire of investors for a secondary trad-
ing market was foreseeable. Yet, the absence of an underwriter during the
primary offering also implied that no market maker would likely make a
secondary market at the conclusion of the initial Spring Street offering. In
addition, because the offering was not registered and Spring Street was
not a "reporting company," current information was lacking about the
company. SEC rules restrict the ability of broker-dealers to quote bid/
asked prices or to make a market in such a stock.
6 1
To remedy this problem, Spring Street Brewing again sought to rely on
the Internet, this time as a substitute for a market maker. Without prior
SEC approval, Spring Street announced at the conclusion of its primary
offering that it had set up an electronic bulletin board on its Web page
where shareholders could trade their shares without the intervention of
any broker or dealer. Specifically, Spring Street created Wit-Trade, which
it described as a "bulletin board based stock market" for trading in Spring
Street's stock. The main menu of the Wit-Trade bulletin board permitted
an investor to "click" on the following separate functions: (i) an explana-
tion of the stock trading mechanism; (ii) a file to register to use Wit-Trade;
(iii) a file of recent financial reports on Spring Street; (iv) a summary of
recent trading activity in the stock; (v) a buyer's bulletin board; (vi) an
entry procedure to list, change, or remove an entry on the buyer's bulletin
board; (vii) a seller's bulletin board; (viii) an entry procedure to list, change,
or remove an entry on the seller's bulletin board; (ix) a procedure for
receiving a standardized "offer and acceptance" form by e-mail; and (x)
a procedure for printing and sending an "offer and acceptance" form by
e-mai. 62 Users would place buy orders on the buyer's bulletin board and
sell orders on the seller's bulletin board. Offers and acceptances were han-
dled by e-mail without the need for oral contact.
60. According to the SEC, alternative trading systems now account for almost 20% of
over-the-counter stock volume and nearly 4% of the NYSE's volume. See Regulation of
Exchanges, supra note 14, at 1635.
61. SEC Rule 15c2-11 precludes a broker-dealer from entering bid or asked quotations
in a security (i.e., making a market) unless it has specified information in its possession. 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1997).
62. For a fuller description, see Boyce, supra note 25.
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This procedure had not, however, been cleared with the SEC, which,
on Wit-Trade's public announcement, quickly requested that trading on
the Wit-Trade system be halted. Arguably, the SEC could have viewed
Wit-Trade as a broker-dealer, or potentially even viewed the entire system
as a stock exchange. In either case, this would have subjected Wit-Trade
to elaborate regulation of its capital structure and governance. The SEC
did not, however, seek to shut down Wit-Trade. Taking a decidedly In-
ternet-friendly approach, it sent Spring Street an informal letter describing
the conditions on which the SEC would insist before permitting bulletin-
board trading to resume over the Internet. 63 Of chief concern to the SEC
was the fact that Spring Street would itself hold the proceeds of every
secondary market trade while the transaction cleared. In the SEC's un-
derstandable view, an independent transfer agent was necessary to lessen
the potential for fraud or embezzlement.
Although the ambitious Wit-Trade bulletin board was never fully im-
plemented, the principals behind Spring Street have announced plans to
develop a broker-dealer firm that will assist in both online public offerings
and bulletin-board trading.64 The SEC, however, formalized the condi-
tions for online bulletin boards in a no-action letter issued to Real Goods
Trading Company (RGTC) inJune 1996.65 This no-action letter has been
widely viewed "as a preliminary green light for Internet trading.
'66
Unlike Spring Street, RGTC was a listed company traded on the Pacific
Coast Stock Exchange. Like Spring Street, however, RGTC had never
registered a public offering; instead, it relied on Regulation A for private
placements. Under RGTC's system, participants would be able to list on
RGTC's bulletin board their names and contact information, the number
of shares of RGTC common stock desired to be sold or purchased, the
price at which the participant was willing to buy or sell, and the date of
such information. No transactions would be conducted over the RGTC
system. RGTC would also play no role in effecting transactions, nor would
it use the system itself to buy or sell its own securities. Participants would
execute their transactions independently of the RGTC system, presumably
by phone contact, and RGTC would receive no compensation for main-
taining the system and would not give advice on the merits of any trans-
action.
Based on these represented facts, the SEC Division of Corporation Fi-
63. See Spring Street Brewing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
435 (Apr. 17, 1996).
64. SeeJed Horowitz, Wit Capital Puts Together More Pieces of Its Strategy, INVESTMENT DEAL-
ERS' DIG., Mar. 10, 1997, at 19, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Idd File.
65. See Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
566 (June 24, 1996).
66. See Gerard R. Boyce, Internet Stock Trading and the SEC, N.Y. LJ.,July 11, 1996, at 5,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Nylawj File. See also Recent Agency Action, 110 HARv.
L. REv. 959 (1997).
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nance agreed that the RGTC system was exempt from registration as a
securities exchange, as a broker-dealer, and as an investment adviser.
67
Similar no-action letters have now been issued to other corporations, again
on the terms that the corporation (i) not buy or sell securities on its system,
(ii) not give advice with respect to transactions, and (iii) not receive com-
pensation in any form for maintaining the system. 68 The SEC staff has
warned, however, that persons who enter two-sided quotations on such
bulletin boards effectively may be performing the function of market mak-
ers and will have to register as broker-dealers. In effect, these conditions
have legitimized the possibility of bulletin board trading over the Internet
through issuer-run systems and have permitted the operators of such sys-
tems to escape any obligation (for the present) to register as broker-dealers.
Do these fairly primitive bulletin board trading systems represent an
important evolutionary advance in market structure? In all likelihood,
these systems, at least as implemented by the individual issuer, will not
grow much beyond their current scale. For the most part, they offer a
matching service for issuers whose level of trading is insufficient to attract
a market maker. In the case of listed companies (such as RGTC), they
seem more a useful component in a sophisticated shareholder relations
program than an attempt to compete against existing market intermedi-
aries. Although an issuer-run bulletin board can economize on brokerage
costs for odd-lot and other small transactions, the great deficiency is the
lack of assured liquidity. For the small investor whose trading decision is
typically liquidity-driven (i.e., the investor needs the money for some other
purpose), brokerage costs are less of a consideration than quick execution
and price continuity. Use of a bulletin board in this thinly traded context
may easily entail a several day wait for a buyer followed by a period of
uncertainty as to whether the trade will actually settle. This counterparty
risk cannot easily be eliminated because issuers are not likely to guarantee
performance by either party. Experience with such systems may convince
investors that market makers are cheap at the price. Similarly, issuers, who
receive no compensation for establishing such bulletin boards, may find
them an expensive investment in shareholder relations.
Alternative Trading Systems
If complete disintermediation (i.e., the elimination of the dealer as an
intermediary) seems unlikely, partial disintermediation may be more fea-
sible. Partial disintermediation is represented by broker-dealer firms that
establish either a passive matching system or an auction system, in either
67. See Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
566, at *17.
68. See Flamemaster Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 972 (Oct.
29, 1996); PerfectData Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 700 (Aug.
5, 1996).
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case permitting market participants to trade directly without the interven-
tion of a dealer as intermediary.69 A number of such systems have been
placed in operation by discount brokerage firms, but they seem to have
had no better than modest success to this point. For example, one of the
best known such systems, InterConnect, established by jack White & Co.,
a West Coast discount broker, covers thirty of the most actively traded
stocks on NASDAQ (Intel, Microsoft, etc.). Its system allows investors to
enter their own buy and sell orders anonymously in an open order book,
and automatically executes trades some eight times a day at the midpoint
of the best bid and asked spread. 70 Attractive as this sounds, however,
InterConnect has this year matched only an estimated ten to fifteen trades
per week.71 Risky as generalizations are, the supply of electronic trading
systems at this point appears to be outstripping the demand.
But will investor indifference to online crossing systems continue? Put
differently, why would investors ignore the opportunity to trade between
the spread? For the future, two answers suggest a limited role for such
systems: First, retail investors want immediacy and will resist waiting even
an hour for an automated execution so long as prices could move adversely
to them over that period. 72 Second, the desire to trade between the bid/
asked spread increases as spreads widen and subsides as spreads narrow.
Here, recent developments, such as the SEC's new order handling rules
and the advent of decimalization, imply reduced spreads and hence re-
duced demand for electronic crossing systems. Indeed, the SEC's new
order handling rules permit investors to place themselves between the bid/
asked spread on NASDAQ by entering limit orders, chiefly through the
medium of "electronic communications networks" (ECNs).73 Some new
ECNs seem to have been created principally for the purpose of facilitating
69. In a recent Concept Release, the SEC estimates that broker-dealer firms have placed
over 140 alternative trading systems in operation (although some are only for internal use
by traders within a single firm). See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 14, at 1639 n. 14.
70. See Kimberly Weisul, Leveling the Trading Field; Unlike Institutions, Retail Investors Have
Largely Been Unable to Cross Their Trades... Until Now, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Aug. 26,
1996, at 14.
71. See Gracian Mack, Retailers Efforts to Remove Traders Hasn't Worked, TRADERS, Feb. 1997,
at 48, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacx File.
72. Even in the case of Instinct, the largest and best known trading system, match rates
usually fall below 30%, meaning that the customer's trade is usually not executed. See Leslie
Eaton, Wall Street Without Walls-A Special Report; Slow Transition for Investing; Stock Market Meets
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996, at Al. This is a less serious problem for the institutional
trader, which is regularly executing portfolio trading strategies and has a lesser need for
immediacy. In this light, to attract retail customers, execution must either be guaranteed
(which is unlikely) or crossing systems must provide for an automated fallback referral to the
market if a match cannot quickly be found.
73. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37619A, 63 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 2083 (Sept. 6, 1996).
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such competition. 74 Although these developments are promoting both
competition and partial disintermediation, they do not require the use of
online alternative trading systems or the Internet to attain their goals.
Whatever the level of investor interest in online alternative trading sys-
tems, their advent also raises serious public policy issues. In a recent Con-
cept Release, the SEC recognized that one incentive for the rapid growth
of alternative trading systems has been the shield they provide to some
market participants from the norm of transparency that governs trading
activity on the exchanges and NASDAQ The SEC's leading concern in
this regard is that "[a]lternative trading systems are not fully integrated
into the national market system. As a result, activity on alternative trading
systems is not fully disclosed to, or accessible by, public investors. The
trading activity on these systems may not be adequately surveilled for
market manipulation and fraud."
'75
Essentially, the SEC is concerned that the activity of participants on
alternative trading systems who are not market makers or specialists is not
disclosed to the public market. As a result, it concluded: "Because a ma-
jority of trading interest on alternative trading systems is not integrated
into the national market system, price transparency is impaired and dis-
semination of quotation information is incomplete. ' 76 As an example, the
Concept Release points to the SEC's recent investigation of NASDAQ
trading, which specifically analyzed "trading in the two most significant
trading systems for NASDAQ securities (Instinet and SelectNet)" and
found "that the majority of bids and offers displayed by market makers in
these systems were better than those posted publicly on NASDAQ."
77
Although the Concept Release discusses several regulatory options, its
clear preference appears to be to expand the definition of exchange to
include both active trading systems (such as Instinet) and low-volume and
passive systems, presumably including even issuer bulletin boards. This is
a virtual about-face from the SEC's position in 1989 when, in a proposed
rule (now withdrawn), it noted that an expansive definition of the exchange
registration requirement would impose substantial burdens on existing
proprietary trading systems, such as Internet and POSIT.78 That was then,
however, and this is now. Alternative trading systems are out of the nurs-
ery, and the SEC no longer feels the need to coddle the larger of them. It
74. The Island System is operated by Datek Securities Corp., a registered broker-dealer
and long a "SOES activist." Island System has accepted the designation of an ECN. See
Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 14, at 1646 n.59. Not all ECNs display to the public
the best prices of all orders entered into their systems, but at least two ECNs now do. Id. at
1645 n.58. Doing so clearly shows that the ECN is attempting to facilitate competition to
narrow the bid/asked spread.
75. See id. at 1635.
76. Id. at 1646.
77. Id. at 1645.
78. See Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26708, 43 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) 979 (Apr. 11, 1989).
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does, however, intend to apply a different and much lighter level of regu-
lation to low-volume and passive trading systems. 79 Justified as this ap-
proach may be, it suggests that the prospect of increased regulation and
the loss of immunity from the transparency rules that govern financial
intermediaries is likely to slow the growth of alternative trading systems.
Technological substitutes for market makers and specialists thus face at
least a somewhat uncertain, and possibly forbidding, regulatory future.
PRIVATE MARKETS
Perhaps the least noted area where the SEC recently has taken action
that could result in significant disintermediation has been the private
placement context.80 In three important no-action letters, the SEC staff
has recognized a limited role for the Internet in private placements. The
key doctrinal problem addressed by these no-action letters is the breadth
of the 1933 Act's concept of "general solicitation." Under traditional
dogma, a private placement fails if there is a general solicitation, even if
all the purchasers in the offering are highly sophisticated investors who do
not need the protection of the 1933 Act.8 1 If no registration statement has
been filed, the traditional doctrine is that section 5(c) of the 1933 Act is
violated by a general solicitation, even if no sales are made. 8
2
From this starting point, the SEC had been initially skeptical of any role
for the Internet in private offerings. In a 1995 release on electronic com-
munications, it provided a clear warning that use of an Internet Web site
would typically amount to a "general solicitation" that destroyed a private
placement.83 Specifically, this release deliberately framed an example in
which private placement offering materials were placed on a Web page
and concluded that this action amounted to a general solicitation in vio-
lation of Rule 502(c).
84
Since 1996, however, the SEC has shown an increased friendliness to-
ward the Internet. First, in the IPOnet no-action letter,85 the Division of
Corporation Finance approved a procedure whereby a broker-dealer pub-
lished an accreditation questionnaire on its Web page in order to screen
79. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 14, at 1657-58.
80. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1997).
82. Section 5(c) says that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to
make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy... any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed." 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
83. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 33-
7233, 60 S.E.C. Docket 1091, ex. 20 (Oct. 6, 1995).
84. Id.
85. See IPOnet, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 642 (July 26, 1996).
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potential investors for participation in private placements. Once a sophis-
ticated investor was found to be qualified, the investor would receive a
password permitting access private placement offerings. The investor
could, however, only access to offering materials for private placements
whose offering began after the investor had been so qualified. 8
6
Three months later, the Division of Market Regulation issued a corre-
sponding no-action letter to the Angel Capital Electronic Network (Angel
Network), which permitted it not to register as a broker-dealer under simi-
lar circumstances. 87 The Angel Network was organized and operated by
several universities and non-profit entities under the general sponsorship
of the U.S. Small Business Administration, which funded its development
as part of pilot project to increase the access of venture capital companies
to accredited investors. 88 Again, once qualified, accredited investors would
be provided a password that would enable them to view a list of small
corporate offerings maintained by the Angel Network and to download
the offering circulars. The contemplated offerings were conducted pur-
suant to Regulation A or Rule 504 of Regulation D. No person or entity
would provide investment advice, receive compensation (other than a flat,
nominal fee to cover administrative costs), handle customer funds or se-
curities, participate in negotiations between the issuer and a potential in-
vestor, or otherwise directly assist the issuer or the investors with the com-
pletion of any transaction. Finally, the operators of the Angel Network
would not "hold themselves out as providing any securities-related services
other than a listing or matching service." 89
While the non-profit nature and university and governmental sponsor-
ship of the Angel Network may have influenced the SEC staff, the staff
has subsequently accepted private sponsorship of another network in a
more recent 1997 no-action letter. In the Lamp Technologies Inc. no-
action letter,90 a private software company specializing in the creation and
maintenance of Web sites proposed to establish a Web site that would
86. The SEC no-action letter noted that in reaching its conclusion, the SEC relied on the
fact that "a potential investor could purchase securities only in transactions that are posted
on the password-protected page of IPOnet after that investor's qualification with IPOnet."
Id. at *2. The staff appears to have been concerned that, if the investor could participate in
already commenced offerings, the qualification procedure might become simply a pretext
with the real focus on identifying offerees for the current offering.
87. See Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 812 (Oct. 25, 1996).
88. See Stephanie N. Mehta, Angel Investors to Get On-Line Service, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28,
1996, at B2.
89. Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
812, at *2 (emphasis added). This exception suggests that the Angel Network could establish
a matching system among accredited investors for resale of privately placed securities. This
would be a significantly more difficult doctrinal barrier for the SEC to relax (except possibly
pursuant to Rule 144A, or sales pursuant to Rule 144, after the requisite waiting period).
90. Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 638
(May 29, 1997).
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contain information (including offering memoranda) about "private
funds" that were exempt from regulation under the Investment Company
Act of 194091 and that would be privately offered to investors under Regu-
lation D. Potential investors would again complete a questionnaire de-
signed to allow Lamp Technologies to form a reasonable basis for deter-
mining that each such investor was an "accredited investor" who had at
least a $2 million investment portfolio. Upon qualification, the investor
again would receive a password permitting the investor to access Lamp
Technology's Web site.
The Lamp Technology no-action letter is particularly important be-
cause it goes beyond the narrow conditions placed by the staff on the
IPOnet and Angel Network letters in two respects: (i) it permits each in-
vestor to pay a $500 per month subscription charge ($6000 per year); and
(ii) it permits investors to invest in funds previously posted on Lamp's Web
site, provided that the investor not invest in such a previously listed fund
for thirty days following the subscriber's qualification. This latter provision
sensibly drops the cumbersome prophylactic requirement in the IPOnet
no-action letter that investors could only be given access to offerings that
commenced after the time of their qualification and substitutes a thirty-
day cooling-off period.
92
Taken together, these three no-action letters both establish the concept
that a password-protected Web site does not amount to a "general solic-
itation" or "general advertising" in violation of Rule 502 (and hence of
section 5(c) of the 1933 Act) and the potential to permit a new class of
competitor-the Web site operator-to compete with broker-dealers and
investment advisers. Such a rival would not be a true financial interme-
diary because it could not offer advice on the merits of the investment or
negotiate with the issuer on behalf of the investors, but, under the Angel
Network letter, the network operator could provide a matching service.
Although the three no-action letters avoid the question, logic suggests that
such a matching service might also seek to facilitate secondary transactions
(i.e., private resales) among accredited investors.9 3
91. The private funds claimed to be exempt from regulation as investment companies
pursuant to section 3(c)(1) or (7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which, respectively,
exempt funds held by not more than 100 persons or held by "qualified purchasers." 15
U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7) (1994 & West Supp. 1997).
92. The SEC staff noted, however, a special characteristic of private investment funds in
accepting this substitution: the private funds involved were only available to take subscriptions
on a quarterly or annual basis (and thus would not be in a state of constant solicitation).
Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 638, at *5.
Based on this factor, the staff was satisfied that investors would not be subscribing to the
service "to invest in any particular fund." Id.
93. The SEC's staffhas granted an important no-action letter to Niphix Investments Inc.,
a registered broker-dealer, for an alternative trading system that would specialize in trading
exempt securities issued under Regulation A and securities of businesses that qualified as
"small business issuers" under Rule 405. See Niphix Investments, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
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Indeed, if one can assume that the Lamp Technologies no-action letter
will apply beyond the context of private funds and will be generally avail-
able to networks listing venture capital companies, it probably represents
the leading example to date in which a communications network has ma-
tured to the point that it can compete with a financial intermediary. Of
course, the mere appearance of a new competitor on the scene does not
imply that it will survive or triumph in the resulting competition. Broker-
dealer firms can presumably also market private placements through pass-
word-protected Web sites, can charge transaction-based fees for doing so,
can give investment advice and make recommendations (subject to their
usual suitability obligations), and can sponsor alternative trading systems
for their resale. These differences give the broker-dealer the advantages
of vertical integration in that it can both market the securities in a pass-
word-protected system and possibly sponsor a matching system for their
resale. In such a competition, the traditional financial intermediary still
appears to have the upper hand over a communications network that is
not a broker-dealer.
Looking to the distant future, one can imagine information technology
creating a vastly more expansive role for private markets. If password-
protected systems are sufficient to permit Internet offerings at the primary
market stage, then they arguably should also be sufficient to permit trading
among accredited investors of privately placed securities-in effect, ex-
tending the PORTAL-type secondary market from the "qualified insti-
tutional buyer" level down to the "accredited investor" level. 94 If this
happens, new liquidity might enter the market for private securities and
the volume of privately placed transactions would soar. Any such reallo-
cation of volume between public and private markets raises policy issues
beyond the scope of this Article.
INTERNET ERA UD
If the impact of new trading systems and new electronic distribution
techniques made possible by the Internet remains uncertain, the certainty
1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 566 (Apr. 18, 1997). All trading participants were to be accredited
investors. The interesting question this no-action letter raises is whether the SEC may even-
tually approve a similar system for private resales that were exempt from registration under
the 1933 Act pursuant to Rule 144, or pursuant to the so-called "section 4(1 1/2) exemption"
(for transactions between accredited investors), or, in some cases, pursuant to Rule 144A.
94. The PORTAL market is an electronic market for the resale of securities issued without
registration pursuant to Rule 144A. The early experience with PORTAL has been disap-
pointing because of low volume and limited liquidity. See Franklin J. Chu, The U.S. Private
Market for Foreign Securities, BANKERS MAG.,Jan./Feb. 1991, at 55; Stephen Davis, The Wring
of 144A, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 219, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library,
Abi File. More recently, PORTAL appears to have had increased activity. Cf PORTAL Pilot
Planned for '96, PRIVATE PLACEMENT REP., Oct. 2, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Abbb File.
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of the Internet's impact on the potential for fraud is more evident. Clearly,
the Internet makes possible a vastly wider dissemination of a fraudulent
statement and by a wider class of persons, including those who have no
connection with the issuer and who would not, in its absence, credibly be
able to reach many investors. Whereas the traditional "boiler room" pro-
moter might reach several hundred customers (at most) through fraudulent
phone calls and/or mailings, the fraudulent promoter on the Internet
might reach tens of thousands-and at virtually no cost.
Again, however, this is only half the story. Although fraudulent state-
ments can be disseminated more broadly via the Internet, they are also
more visible. Whereas the SEC can hope to catch the classic "boiler room"
promoter only when an injured victim complains (typically after the fact)
or when, by mistake, the promoter solicits an enforcement official, the
Internet is today subject to ongoing monitoring by SEC enforcement of-
ficials.
95
There are, however, two distinctive problems with Internet fraud. First,
a fraudulent promoter can hide his or her identity on the Internet and
make statements on an anonymous or misattributed basis.96 Second, the
fraudulent statement can originate offshore, beyond the SEC's seeming
reach.
Anonymous Statements
The distinctive new contribution of the Internet to the age-old problem
of fraud is the "chat room." Chat rooms, electronic bulletin boards, news-
groups, or other news forums are sponsored by both the major online
services (e.g., America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy) and by inde-
pendent entrepreneurs who simply establish a Web page. 97 Typically, con-
versations in these chat rooms focus on individual stocks or groups of stocks
that are too small to receive much attention from securities analysts. In-
dividuals can post statements on a bulletin board about the individual
stocks covered by that chat room. These statements range from opinions
to wild predictions (which make no claim to objectivity), and rumors (and
claims that rumors have been confirmed by the company) to deliberately
fabricated lies. A recurrent modus operandi is for several messages to be
posted in rapid succession, all repeating a particular rumor or prediction.
Such concerted action may have been pre-arranged or may have been
sent by the same person using different aliases. The key point is that state-
95. See Cella & Stark, supra note 22, at 835-37.
96. For representative recent stories about the problem of anonymity on the Internet, see
Deborah Lohse, Stock Regulators Are Worried Dangers Lurk for Investors in On-Line Chat Sites, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 12, 1996, at C1; Gregory Spears, The Wild, Wild Web, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN.
MAG., Nov. 1996, at 59, available in LEXIS, News Library, Kippf File.
97. For present purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish here between "private" chat
rooms (for which a subscription fee may be charged) and public newsgroups.
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ments on the Internet can effectively be made anonymously or, worse,
persons may claim the identity of a well-known Internet commentator to
make a false statement.
The best known illustration of this new phenomenon was the sudden
run up in the price and trading volume of Comparator Systems Corpo-
ration (Comparator), a small, probably insolvent company that was sud-
denly rumored in May 1996 to have developed a fingerprint recognition
system that could be incorporated into a major credit card.98 One rumor,
widely circulated on the well-known Motley Fool chat room on America
Online, suggested that MasterCard would soon adopt the Comparator
technology into its credit card system. Almost overnight, the stock rose
from $.03 per share to over $1.75 per share, representing an increase in
aggregate market capitalization from $36 million to over $1 billion. On a
single day in May 1996, more than 178 million shares of Comparator
traded on NASDAQ breaking the single-day record for both NASDAQ
and the New York Stock Exchange. Over three days, in May 1996, 449
million shares traded-until trading was halted by NASD. Ultimately, it
was learned that Comparator's technology was stolen from British re-
searchers and that no basis existed for the rumors that MasterCard had
any contract or understanding with Comparator. The stock price quickly
fell back to a few cents per share, and the company entered bankruptcy
later that year.
More importantly, in the wake of the Comparator scandal, the NASD
conducted an informal study of several others stocks that had experienced
dramatic increases in both trading price and volume and found "a close
correlation between [those increases] and Internet postings." 99 Although
Comparator's management may have culpably misstated key facts, the
real beneficiaries of the manipulation of its stock seem to have been bro-
kerage firms that placed their clients into the stock just before the anon-
ymous tips about the alleged new technology first appeared on the Inter-
net. Small cap stocks, trading in a less than fully efficient market, seem
then uniquely vulnerable to rumors and price manipulation.
But what can be done about this? Neither the SEC nor the NASD has
regulatory authority over ordinary investors who wish to post anonymous
comments in Internet chat rooms, nor can either agency easily detect if
broker-dealers are behind the rumors that it does see posted.
The problem is not only that anonymous commentary is part of the
Internet's cherished anarchic tradition, but that the First Amendment
sometimes protects the right to engage in anonymous speech.100 Still, as
98. For representative stories, see Miller & Petruno, supra note 3 (detailing actual rumors
entered into newsgroups about Comparator); Therese Poletti, Internet Stock Tips Pose Free Speech
Dilemma, REUTERS Bus. REP.,June 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File.
99. See Poletti, supra note 98 (quoting Marc Beauchamp of the NASD).
100. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent decision on anonymous speech
makes clear, the protective cases that shelter anonymous speech rest on
facts that involved political elections where "core political speech" was at
issue, and hence "exacting scrutiny" was the legal standard that had to be
satisfied.' 0 ' Where, however, commercial speech is at issue (as here) and
the clear intent of the legislation is to prevent fraud and manipulation, the
courts have recognized that a far more permissive legal standard would
apply. 102
Nonetheless, it is important to specify the regulatory goal narrowly.
Anonymity itself is not the evil to be suppressed; indeed, anonymity has
been the characteristic style of much Internet communication, where pseu-
donymous commentators often "flame" in language they would probably
not use if their identities were disclosed. But an important distinction can
be drawn between "anonymity" and "traceability."'' 03 Securities regula-
tors need the ability to trace the identity on an after-the-fact basis of anon-
ymous communications sent by e-mail or postings on the Usenet to chat
rooms or newsgroups. They do not need blanket authority to learn the
identity of all "information content providers" (in the Internet parlance)
to a chat room.
A major obstacle to traceability is the rise of anonymous "remailers"
that conceal the identity and even location of the sender. 10 4 Such attempts
to hide the identity of the sender typically require a cooperating agent
who remails the communication to the chat room or newsgroup. Poten-
tially, such a person could be seen as an aider and abetter of a securities
law violation. With the passage of the PSLRA, the SEC has regained the
ability to enjoin knowing aiders and abetters105 The problem with this
approach is that the agent who remails the communication for the original
sender, thereby rendering it anonymous, may not know that the statement
was false or fraudulent. Read closely, however, new section 20(f) of the
1934 Act requires only that the defendant "knowingly provides substantial
assistance to another person."' 0 6 If the SEC were to adopt a release in-
dicating a view that remailing communications, in a manner to render
101. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
102. Id. at 343-44, 348-51.
103. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995.J. ONLINE L. art. 4;
David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability
in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Lee Tien, Innovation and the Information Environment:
Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech?, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 120 (1996).
104. Techniques vary from simple remailing that deletes the message heading to more
sophisticated forms of encryption. See Froomkin, supra note 103, para. 20-25; Tien, supra note
103, at 120 n.5.
105. New section 20(f) of the 1934 Act provides that "any person that knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter... shall
be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided." See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 1 1995).
106. Id.
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them anonymous, to a chat room or newsgroup known to be conducting
discussions about securities prices and values could make one an aider and
abetter of the original party's primary violation, the extent of this practice
should decline.
Of course, the simpler, more direct path might be to focus on the op-
erator of the chat room itself. Most, but not all, chat rooms have private
sponsors who limit access to subscribers. Today, most major online ser-
vices exercise some supervision to delete obscene comments or sexual ref-
erences, 10 7 and presumably they can also take reasonable steps to delete
those comments that come from anonymous remailers. This would in-
volve, however, a monitoring burden that they may not wish to shoulder.
Nor is it clear that they are legally obligated to do so. As a result of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996,108 section 230(c)(1) of title 47 now
provides: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." 109 Although these words literally say noth-
ing about liability as an aider and abetter, the congressional intent seems
to have been to give broad protection to online services from common
law suits based on a failure to monitor information content providers.
Attempts to impose such a duty seem beyond the authority of the SEC,
particularly when it has jurisdiction to enjoin only "knowing" aiders and
abetters. I 10
The one remaining candidate over whom the SEC does have clear
authority and much leverage is the broker-dealer industry. No doubt exists
about the authority of regulators to require broker-dealers and other se-
curities professionals to disclose their own identity, but closer questions
surround their vicarious responsibility for the communications of others.
The SEC staff has long indicated that "a broker-dealer conducting busi-
ness over the Internet should consider the extent to which it may be re-
sponsible for content provided by a third party."' The NASD has also
107. Cyber Patrol, first introduced in 1995, now serves both direct Internet access pro-
viders (e.g., Netcom, Uunet, etc.), and commercial online service providers (e.g., America
Online, CompuServe, Prodigy, etc.), is compatible with all Web browsers (e.g., Netscape,
Netcruiser, Mosaic, etc.), and seeks to detect and delete inappropriate materials. See ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Technologi-
cally, it or similar software could seemingly also detect non-traceable sources and deny them
access, delete their comments, or at least specially label their comments.
108. Pub. L. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 133-39, struck down in part by, Reno,
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
109. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997). This statute was intended to reverse a
specific unreported case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). See R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Note, Defamation in Cyber-
space: A Court Takes a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co., 49 ARK. L. REV. 589, 593-95 (1996).
110. See supra note 105.
111. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act LEXIS 976,
at *5 n.l (Nov. 27, 1996).
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indicated that a broker-dealer must not link to a Web site that the member
knows contains misleading information about the member's products or
services. 11 2 This rule could easily be extended to bar linking to a Web site
in which anonymous and non-traceable communications were known to
be prevalent. In turn, by furnishing the names of Web sites to broker-
dealers that were so dominated, regulators could discourage broker-dealer
linkages to such Web sites and possibly in turn motivate their sponsors to
monitor for non-traceable communications." 13
The pessimistic bottom line for the present is that one cannot identify
a convenient gatekeeper that easily can be pressured or persuaded to moni-
tor the content or traceability of messages posted in chat rooms or on
similar bulletin boards. Although the SEC may be able to jawbone the
major online services into some limited monitoring, the anarchic orien-
tation of the Internet culture, which tends fervently to persist in the mis-
taken belief that cyberspace is beyond the reach of the law, implies that
other, smaller sponsors are likely to be intransigent. Among the various
secondary participants, only the anonymous remailers look like deserving
candidates for enforcement actions, and even in these instances prior
warnings might wisely be given.
For the future, however, traceability should be as important a goal for
regulators as is transparency. At a time when the SEC is concerned that
alternative trading systems allow market participants to hide their identi-
ties, it would be ironically inconsistent to permit far more misleading mes-




The SEC's problems in dealing with anonymous messages in chat
rooms pale in comparison with the enforcement problems it encounters
with foreign broker-dealers and foreign exchanges, The problem is not
that the SEC's jurisdictional reach is limited. In fact, the 1934 Act applies
to foreign broker-dealers as well as to domestic ones and prohibits the use
of any jurisdictional means to induce or to attempt to induce the purchase
or sale of any security, unless the broker-dealer is registered with the
SEC. 1 4 The SEC rules also expressly regulate the activities of foreign
broker-dealers, 115 and SEC releases have suggested that broker-dealer reg-
istration with the SEC is required even in the case of a foreign broker-
112. See NASD Regulatory & Compliance Alert, Ask the Analysts About Electronic Com-
munications (Apr. 1996).
113. Paradoxically, there is also the countervailing danger that any such list might be
perceived as a list of "hot" Web sites, thereby increasing the investor attention paid to them.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1994).
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1997).
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dealer with no presence in the United States, but who uses U.S. phone
lines to trade securities with or for U.S. persons located in the United
States. 1 6 Indeed, the SEC has even suggested that a foreign broker-dealer
who simply executes unsolicited orders from U.S. customers may have to
register.' 17 In general, U.S. courts have supported the SEC's views and
broadly found subject matter jurisdiction to exist in securities cases.' 1 8
But now, test the SEC's powers against the following practical case. An
entrepreneur in Central Europe or Southeast Asia begins making a market
in certain heavily traded foreign stocks (and possibly some well-known U.S.
stocks) and publishes price quotations on a real-time basis on a Web page.
This new market maker is located in a host country with strong free-market
views (e.g., the Czech Republic or Singapore) and a distaste for govern-
mental intervention in the marketplace. Most importantly, this entrepre-
neur has no assets or operations in the United States. Technically, this
market maker does not mail or wire information into the United States;
rather, the interconnected character of the Internet's network of networks
does that by itself."l9 In any event, some U.S. customers do access this
116. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-27017, 43 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2079, 2084 n.41 (July 11, 1989).
117. Id. at 2086 & n.52. Suffice it to say that this is a more controversial assertion of SEC
jurisdiction, which no court has yet upheld.
118. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995); Zoelsch v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
119. The Internet is a "giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups
of linked computer networks." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd,
117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). This point may have considerable jurisdictional significance because
the information content provider does not voluntarily penetrate the space of a jurisdiction
in the same way that it does by mailing a letter or sending a wire. Rather, the audience finds
the content provider by using browsing strategies and search engines. This distinction may
prove important under the standard "minimum contacts" test used by federal courts to
determine the outer constitutional boundaries on personal jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Na-
tionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (a foreign defendant must have
minimum level of contact with jurisdiction that allows exercise ofjurisdiction to be reason-
able); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The case law on when
an Internet user can be sued in a foreign jurisdiction is scarce. For an important decision in
which a service provider (CompuServe, Inc.) was able to establish personal jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant, see CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). See also
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Still, the
minimum contacts between the defendants in these cases and the forum state seem substan-
tially greater than those of the market maker with the United States in the hypothetical in
the text. For a decision finding insufficient minimum contacts based on use of the Internet
to establish personal jurisdiction, see Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d
1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Obviously, different interests, and a different statute, apply
in the SEC's case, but even in the most expansive decisions upholding personal jurisdiction
in cases brought by the SEC against a foreign defendant, the defendant had typically engaged
in a securities transaction in a U.S. securities market or had opened a U.S. brokerage account.
See, e.g., SEC v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413 (10th Cir. 1996); SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir. 1990).
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new "Internet Stock Market" because of its extended hours of operation,
low transaction costs, and electronic execution capability.
What can the SEC do? Of course, it can seek an injunction from a U.S.
court. The enforceability of that injunction (or any other decree or order)
abroad, however, seems doubtful. Other jurisdictions may well feel that
the host country's own laws should govern because the market maker did
not truly enter the United States in any traditional sense. Indeed, a clever
entrepreneur might even add a conspicuous provision on its Web page
that persons placing orders with it thereby accept a forum selection pro-
vision that makes the courts of the host country the exclusive forum in
which a private action may be maintained against it.120
As a practical matter, the SEC's ability to prevent this entrepreneur
from interacting with U.S. investors without registration will depend on
its ability either (i) to identify some necessary connecting link between the
foreign entrepreneur and U.S. investors (i.e., a gatekeeper) and bring suf-
ficient pressure to bear on this gatekeeper to enable the SEC substantially
to achieve its regulatory purposes; or (ii) to secure an international agree-
ment with which the host country is a party that governs the dissemination
of securities data and offering materials over the Internet. This year, in its
"Regulation of Exchanges" Concept Release, the SEC has explored the
former approach.
121
Essentially, the Concept Release first examines the possibility of relying
on the host country's own regulatory system and, second, the possibility
of forcing foreign exchanges to register with the SEC. Then, after noting
problems with both approaches, it discovers (much like Goldilocks) a third
approach, which the release implies is neither too hot nor too cold. This
approach, it terms, "regulating access providers to foreign markets."'
122
Who are "access providers"? They "fall into two basic categories."' 123 First,
the release suggests that "entities that distribute or publish information
regarding transactions on a foreign market, and provide a direct electronic
link on behalf of the U.S. members of that foreign market" could be
regulated as "securities information processors" (SIPs). 124 Second, accord-
ing to the release, broker-dealers (both foreign and domestic) who "provide
U.S. persons who are not members of a foreign market with the techno-
120. This would not affect the SEC's suit, but might preclude private litigation depending
on a legal standard that currently differs from circuit to circuit. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corporation of
Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
121. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 14, at 1695-1704.
122. See id. at 1695.
123. Id.
124. Id. The term "securities information processor" is defined in section 3a(22)(A) of the
1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22)(A) (1994). Such persons are required to register with the
SEC and to comply with SEC rules by section IIA of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-
I(b).
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logical capability to trade directly on a foreign market" require similar
regulation. 1
25
Is anyone left out by these definitions? Online communication firms
that simply provide data and have no "direct electronic link" to an ex-
change member appear to escape the first category and clearly are not
broker-dealers. Therefore, they also escape the second definition. Even if
a network operator provides a direct electronic link, the Concept Release
does not deem it a SIP unless the link is provided "on behalf of the U.S.
members of that foreign market."' 126 This seemingly means that e-mail and
the major commercial online services are not covered. Thus, U.S. citizens
could still transact with our hypothetical foreign market maker (either by
e-mail or an online service firm) as long as no U.S. broker is involved. To
be sure, the foreign market maker may well be covered, but it may be
effectively unreachable.
Of course, SEC thinking is still at an early stage, and it may yet tighten
its definitions. But the basic approach primarily reaches broker-dealers
and their agents. Remaining unregulated is the variety of communication
networks that would be given a strong incentive to grow and fill in the
interstices left unregulated by this proposal. Even in the case of those
entities that are regulated by this approach, it is not clear that SEC au-
thority to regulate SIPs is a sufficient regulatory hook upon which the SEC
can hang all its regulatory aspirations. For example, can such a SIP be
held responsible for the fact that the London Stock Exchange has a very
different attitude towards transparency than does the SEC? The most that
seems appropriate is some form of disclosure (which will swiftly become
boilerplate) about the differences in market structure and operation be-
tween the United States and London.
An alternative approach is to seek international agreements, possibly
styled as memoranda of understanding, 127 and possibly negotiated on a
global level through the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions. Unquestionably, this approach would be slower. Inevitably,
many nations would not be signatories, and others would, in any event,
not abide by its conventions. The advantage, however, is that with co-
operation comes effective reciprocal enforcement. But this approach will
clearly never end regulatory disparities (that is, the London Stock Ex-
change may unfortunately continue to view price transparency as a fetish
of American regulators).
Toward Accommodation
If international agreements are pursued, it is predictable that the U.S.
regulatory position will quickly become untenable that an offer made on
125. Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 14, at 1695.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Memoranda of understanding are deemed not to be treaties and thus not to require
Senate ratification. At least, that is the theory.
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the Internet subjects the offeror to the jurisdiction of courts in every ju-
risdiction to which the offer is transmitted (i.e., the whole world). Unlike
mailing an offer into the United States (which is the underlying fact pattern
in many U.S. cases that have found subject matter jurisdiction), publishing
an offer on the Internet is qualitatively different; in effect, the audience
finds the offeror, rather than the reverse. Because more evidence thus will
be necessary to establish jurisdiction, the SEC's enforcement efforts will
be complicated. Regrettably, complicated enforcement is likely to be the
necessary price of international comity.
What should be the standard? Regulation S already offers a well-estab-
lished standard: Have there been "directed selling efforts" in the United
States?128 But this leads in a circle back to the basic question: Should the
posting of offering material on the Internet (presumably in downloadable
form) amount to "directed selling efforts" in the United States? That is,
suppose a British or Hong Kong firm places a prospectus on the Internet
for an offering that is principally targeted at citizens in its own country.
This seems basically innocuous, even if some U.S. citizens see it and some-
how buy the offering.
A practical answer here could emerge from following the practice al-
ready adopted by state "blue sky" regulators. Although state blue sky
regulators have consistently taken the position that electronic offerings are
not exempt from their statutes, they have largely agreed on a compromise
first developed by Pennsylvania. Recognizing the inherent tendency for
overregulation in the doctrinal position that an Internet offer is an offer
in all fifty states, Pennsylvania developed a procedure for exempting In-
ternet communications if (i) the offering documents indicate that the se-
curities are not being offered to persons in Pennsylvania; (ii) the securities
are, in fact, not offered to Pennsylvania residents by any other means; and
(iii) no sales of the securities are made in Pennsylvania as a result of the
offering. 129 If these conditions are not satisfied, Pennsylvania takes the po-
sition that an offer made on the Internet constitutes a mass mailing, public
media advertisement, and general solicitation subject to its statute.13
0
The basic framework of the Pennsylvania order has been adopted by a
number of other states, 131 and in January 1996, the North American Se-
128. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b) (1997).
129. See In re Orders Effected Through Internet that Do Not Result in Sales in Pennsyl-
vania, Order of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, available in 1995 WL 574678
(Pa.Sec.Com.) (Aug. 31, 1995). See also Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to 1-704 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). See generally K. Robert Bertraum, Offers
and Sales of Securities on the Internet, PRAc. LAw., Oct. 1996, at 23; Ronald Loeb & David
Richter, Electronic Offerings: Securities Law in the Age of the Internet (PLI Corp. Law and Practice
Handbook Series No. B4-7142, 1996).
130. See Bertraum, supra note 129, at 26.
131. Some 20 NASDAA jurisdictions have apparently provided transactional relief for
Internet offerings, either by order, regulation, or no-action position. Other states face stat-
utory problems, however, that make it impossible for them to grant exemptive relief without
new legislation. Id. at 27-28.
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curities Administrators Association (NASAA) also endorsed it. 132 The res-
olution adopted by NASAA recommends to its member jurisdictions that
offers on the Internet be exempted from the registration provisions of state
securities laws when "[t]he Internet offer indicates, directly or indirectly,
that the securities are not being offered to the residents of a particular
jurisdiction; and [a]n offer is not otherwise specifically directed to any
person in a jurisdiction by or on behalf of the issuer of the securities."
133
This same approach can be replicated on the international level. Today,
nothing in Regulation S assures an issuer that an Internet communication
intended for one audience (say, Europeans) will not be deemed to consti-
tute "directed selling efforts" in the United States. 134 Should the issuer
later wish to sell to sophisticated U.S. institutional investors, either in a
private placement or by means of extraterritorial sales outside the United
States, such an Internet communication could be fatal to the exemption
(whether the exemption claimed is Regulation S for extraterritorial offers
or Regulation D for private placements).
CONCLUSION
The recurrent themes in this Article have involved gatekeepers and
intermediaries. The gatekeeper has played a critical role in the history of
securities regulation. To the extent that the 1933 Act worked, it did so by
enlisting (under duress) underwriters, accountants, and directors to un-
dertake the task of verifying issuer statements. A similar strategy is now
evident in the new SEC Concept Release on exchange regulation: the
SEC is attempting to enlist those having the technological ability to con-
nect U.S. investors with foreign markets by characterizing them as SIPs.
Similarly, this Article has suggested that to interdict Internet fraud, the
cooperation of another class of gatekeepers must be secured: namely, those
who sponsor and can monitor chat rooms and newsgroups that are focused
on securities valuation topics.
But the realistic capacity of gatekeepers to undertake such monitoring
obligations is not unlimited. In a slower-paced era, the 1933 Act's strategy
worked well, but outside the IPO context, it is highly questionable that it
is working as effectively today. Correspondingly, the duties that SIPs can
be expected to assume seem modest. If greater obligations are imposed,
the result largely will be to throw sand in the gears that connect global
markets-to no one's long term benefit.
Put more generally, while underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and di-
rectors are classic gatekeepers, securities information processors and chat
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id.
134. Indeed, at least if the offering material is in English, the same rules will probably
apply as govern non-password-protected Web pages in private placements. See supra notes
80-94 and accompanying text.
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room sponsors are not. They are not "incorruptible outsiders" that the
primary actor employs "to gain legitimacy or expertise or to meet a legal
requirement,"' 13 5 but merely participants in a private commercial rela-
tionship that can easily be overburdened. Nor do they necessarily possess
the reputational capital to motivate them to interdict offenses to protect
their own reputations. This does not mean that they should not be con-
scripted, but rather that the duties imposed should be limited and specific.
With respect to financial intermediaries, this Article is skeptical of pre-
dictions that the Internet implies their extinction. Their persistence has
puzzled economists for years-and will continue to do so. But partial dis-
intermediation is a real prospect. This structure, under which traditional
intermediaries face competition from new unregulated entrants perform-
ing functionally equivalent tasks, has now vividly appeared on the scene
with the emergence of alternative trading systems. It will predictably re-
appear in other contexts as well as technological innovation introduces
new competitors. In each instance, issues will predictably surface about
whether the playing field is level between the traditional intermediary and
the new entrant.
Nonetheless, these are not the most important issues for the future. If
this Article is correct in its judgment that financial intermediaries are not
likely to wither away in the face of technological change, the advent of
the Internet does not imply a crisis for the future of the securities laws,
but only the need for some relatively modest updating and streamlining.
To the extent it is wrong, however, (and this possibility is non-trivial), then
a reduced role for financial intermediaries implies a system without mean-
ingful gatekeepers or a coherent strategy for testing the accuracy of issuer
disclosures. In that event, the most basic assumptions of the federal secu-
rities laws may need to be reconsidered.
135. For the standard definition of "gatekeeper" in a strategy of third-party liability as
requiring such a relationship, see Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the
Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857, 891 (1984). See also Kraakman, supra note 24.
